Border Issues

I have lamented the failure to integrate planning for ecological areas that cross the US/Mexican border (e.g., the Colorado River/Delta, Salton Sea and tires (!)), but other areas are also in trouble.

CC sent me some information on the water problems at the El Paso/Ciudad Juárez border. Basically, they share an aquifer and surface source (the Rio Grande), but they have few effective ways to prevent over-use and/or contamination. [Navarro -- the blog author who appears very knowledgeable about the area -- offers this information as a motivation for a "solution" of a shared water system.]

Interestingly, the problems with water have parallels with the problems of drugs at the border, i.e., gangs in Mexico fighting each other (and the police) as they move drugs North to the gringos.

The damage from flawed drug policies (1,600 murders in Juarez in 2008; 5,600 drug-related executions in all of Mexico) parallels the damage from flawed water policies (aquifers dry in less than 20 years).

The solution in both cases is to pay attention to supply and demand.

Gringos demand drugs. Because it's illegal to sell them drugs, illegal gangs [yes, redundant, but I am trying to spell this out...] supply those drugs at profits large enough to kill for.

People demand water. Because local monopolists (water utilities) do not have clear rights to water and charge too little for water, water supplies are depleted to the point of endangering the lives and livelihoods of those on both sides of the border.

The solution, in both cases, must recognize economic incentives.

If drugs are legalized, then people can buy them from stores instead of gangs. Without profits, gangs move on (dancing away, West Side Story style), police are less corrupt, and murders fall. [El Paso's city council voted 8-0 to discuss the "Nation's flawed drug policies." They were then unable to override the mayor's veto. Why? They feared losing federal funding. Can I have my Tenth Amendment back, please?!]

If water rights are confirmed and prices are raised to levels that reduce demand to sustainable levels, then the poor will end up with water (via the lifeline), the aquifer will not dry out, the environment will be healthier, and water mangers will be able to nap during their siesta -- instead of engaging in continuous crisis management.

Bottom Line: People will NOT play nice when incentives reward other actions.