tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-214725724832377908.post6675001547542865924..comments2008-09-24T11:55:26.912-07:00David Zetlandhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11677758798533719965dzetland@gmail.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-214725724832377908.post-60229263523410972312008-09-24T11:55:26.912-07:002008-09-24T11:55:26.912-07:00Took a closer look at the "supporting material" for the Costello paper last night and think it is pretty robust. The fact that ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries don't seem to have differential trends before an ITQ is implemented but DO show a widening (statistically offsetting) gap in failure probability AFTER ITQs are implemented suggests there is a fundamental treatment effect from the characteristics of the ITQ itself that accrues over time. <BR/><BR/>Since many fisheries go through some form of "regulated open access" on the way to rationalization and these fisheries are much more likely to select into the ITQ treatment one would expect a differential trend toward failure BEFORE ITQs if it was the hard caps or regulatory capacity that caused the improvement, not the property rights themselves. These effects may actually be captured in the treatment dummy, ITQ(i) (although testing this would require a similar analysis controlling for or sub-sampling on pre-ITQ regulatory status) suggesting that the institutional pre-conditions for ITQs (hard TACs, strong top-down monitoring and enforcement traditions) may reduce the probability of collapse at any point in time but do not help to slow the trend toward eventual overfishing (at least by the Myers and Worm catch-based definition).Joshua Abbotthttp://www.public.asu.edu/~jkabbottnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-214725724832377908.post-8037072149935945272008-09-22T07:05:46.433-07:002008-09-22T07:05:46.433-07:00One does note that this contribution derives entirely from UC. The State of California is getting value for its dollar.Fixed Carbonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06321707907871138659noreply@blogger.com